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As with all systematic models of therapy, cognitive ther-
apy distills a theory to the understanding of particular
cases through the case formulation method. This article
sets out criteria to evaluate whether cognitive case for-
mulation follows the process of scientiﬁc inquiry, and it
questions whether the formulation method meets these
criteria. In terms of the evidence base for the cognitive
theory that underpins cognitive case formulation, the
research suggests that although the descriptive elements
of cognitive theory are substantiated, the explanatory el-
ements have received less support. In terms of the scien-
tiﬁc status of the cognitive case formulation process, cur-
rent evidence for the reliability of the cognitive case
formulation method is modest, at best. There is a striking
paucity of research examining the validity of cognitive
case formulations or the impact of cognitive case formu-
lation on therapy outcome. Implications for the clinical
use of cognitive case formulation within a scientist-
practitioner model are discussed, and potential programs
of research to evaluate the case formulation method are
described.
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Since the seminal publication of Cognitive Therapy and the
Emotional Disorders (A. T. Beck, 1976), cognitive therapy
has emerged as one of the most popular and widely taught
therapeutic modalities of the last 20 years (Rush & Beck,
2000), because, in part, of its consistency with the scientist-
practitioner model. Although the scientist-practitioner
model has been controversial (Albee, 1970;Barlow, 1981;
Barlow, Hayes, & Nelson, 1984; Garﬁeld, 1998; Rice,
1997; Strupp, 1976), it has probably been the dominant
model within clinical psychology since the American Psy-
chological Association’s (APA) landmark Boulder confer-
ence (Raimy, 1950).
A primary reason for the widespread acceptance of cog-
nitive therapy is its concordance with the scientist-
practitioner model. For example, in the area of depression
several scholarly reviews (Clark & Beck, 1999; Coyne &
Gotlib, 1983;Haaga, Dyck, & Ernst, 1991;Kwon & Oei,
1994; Teasdale, 1983; Whisman, 1993) suggest consistent
support for important aspects of the cognitive theory of
depression. In addition, numerous therapy outcome stud-
ies suggest that for a signiﬁcant proportion of individuals,
cognitive therapy for depression leads to a clinically signif-
icant relief of depressive symptoms (see Clark & Beck;
DeRubeis & Crits-Christoph, 1998; Dobson, 1989;
Robinson, Berman, & Neimeyer, 1990). Similar scholarly
reviews suggest support for important aspects of the cog-
nitive theory of anxiety disorders (e.g., Rapee, 1991) and
support for cognitive therapy as an eﬃcacious and eﬀective
intervention for anxiety disorders (Barlow, Gorman, Shear,
& Woods, 2000; see also DeRubeis & Crits-Christoph).
Finally, there is also some support for cognitive theory of
personality disorders (see Cottraux & Blackburn, 2001).
Although it is premature to judge the eﬃcacy or eﬀective-
ness of cognitive therapy for personality disorders, prelim-
inary evidence suggests that patients with comorbid Axis
I and II disorders respond to cognitive therapy, albeit less
favorably than those with Axis I disorders alone (e.g.,
Kuyken, Kurzer, DeRubeis, Beck, & Brown, 2001;Men-
nin & Heimberg, 2000).
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remains an important weak link. Although cognitive ther-
apy is eﬀective at relieving a variety of symptoms in diﬀer-
ent disorders in large-scale randomized, controlled clinical
trials and eﬀectiveness studies, researchers cannot conclude
that cognitive therapy is eﬀective because its statements about
etiology and mechanisms of change are correct. That is, cognitive
therapy may work well—may even well work well by
changing maladaptive beliefs—but some of the key as-
sumptions that underlie the practice of cognitive therapy
may be ﬂawed. Yet, to the scientist-practitioner cognitive
therapist, individualized case formulation is the heart of
evidence-based practice. It occupies a fundamental place in
clinical psychology, like the role of diagnosis in psychiatry.
The cognitive case formulation literature (e.g., J. S. Beck,
1995;Needleman, 1999;Persons & Tompkins, 1997) sug-
gests a broad range of claimed beneﬁts for cognitive case
formulation. These include the provision of a systematic
cognitive theory framework for hypothesizing about a
person’s presenting problems, individualized cognitive ther-
apy treatment protocols, improved description and under-
standing of presenting problems (for therapist and client),
improved therapeutic alliance, more focused therapeutic
interventions, and enhanced treatment outcomes. Sur-
prisingly, we do not know of any review that evaluates
these claims. This article evaluates the research evidence to
establish whether the use of individualized case formula-
tions in cognitive therapy can be justiﬁed. We ﬁrst outline
the case formulation approach and then propose criteria to
evaluate its evidence base within the scientist-practitioner
model.
THE COGNITIVE CASE FORMULATION APPROACH
Most established schools of psychotherapy advocate that a
person’s presenting problems be clearly deﬁned and under-
lying psychological mechanisms be articulated (Eells,
1997). Case formulation aims to describe a person’s pre-
senting problems and to use theory to make explanatory
inferences about causes and maintaining factors that can in-
form interventions. Case formulation schemes generally
have several shared key elements (Table 1). These schemes
include a description of manifest presenting problems, im-
portant relevant developmental history, causal factors (dis-
tal and proximal), maintaining factors, coping strengths
and weaknesses, and guides for intervention. Beyond these
elements, a case formulation comprises a set of hypothe-
ses about the underlying mechanisms that link these ele-
ments. For example, why does this person have these
problems at this time, and what factors are maintaining the
problems? In most deﬁnitions, case formulation is theo-
retically grounded while maintaining the “essence”of the
presenting problems for a particular individual (e.g., Den-
man, 1995).
Cognitive case formulation can be deﬁned as a coher-
ent set of explanatory inferences about the factors causing
and maintaining a person’s presenting problems, inferences
derived from the cognitive theory of emotional disorders.
In terms of a “here and now”view, this would normally in-
clude a statement of the core beliefs, dysfunctional as-
sumptions, and compensatory strategies underpinning the
problems, as well as any problematic cognitive styles or
behavioral patterns that maintain the person’s difﬁculties.
In terms of a developmental view, this would normally
include a statement of how distal and proximal develop-
mental information might have led to the development of
beliefs, cognitive styles, and compensatory strategies. A
complete cognitive case formulation would normally in-
clude the presenting problems (in terms of cognition,
aﬀect, and behavior), relevant developmental information,
hypothesized cognitive mechanisms underpinning the
presenting problems, strengths and resources, and implica-
tions for intervention.1 A cognitive case formulation is
emphatically an account of a person’s presenting problems,
not of the whole person.
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Table 1. Case formulation: deﬁnition, properties, and key elements
Deﬁnition Properties Elements
A provisional map of a person’s presenting  Describes and explains presenting problems in  Description of manifest presenting problems 
problems that describes the territory of the  terms that can be operationalized (cognition,  (in clear, speciﬁc, and measurable terms)
problems and explains the processes that caused affect, and behavior) Developmental history
and maintain the problems Is reliable and valid Causal factors (distal and proximal)
Provides guides for intervention Maintaining factors
Is an active and ongoing process, responsive  Guides for intervention
to new dataThere have been several attempts to provide cognitive
theory–based individualized case formulation systems (e.g.,
J. S. Beck, 1995;Greenberger & Padesky, 1995;Linehan,
1993; Muran & Segal, 1992; Persons, 1993) that diﬀer in
emphasis in terms of structural elements included and the
process of formulating. We will brieﬂy review the Persons
(1989, 1993) and J. S. Beck (1995) schemes, before ex-
trapolating a model that cuts across the diﬀerent cognitive
case formulation schemes. The Persons (1989, 1993;Per-
sons & Tompkins, 1997) system focuses on two levels,
overt diﬃculties and underlying cognitive mechanisms.
Overt diﬃculties map directly onto what has been de-
scribed as presenting problems (Table 1). Underlying
mechanisms refer to an explanation of how the maladap-
tive cognitive processing, beliefs, and behaviors cause and
maintain presenting problems. Persons (1993) stresses the
importance of identifying and working with the core be-
liefs and triggers to render the person less vulnerable. J. S.
Beck (1995) has developed a system that uses (a) the de-
velopmental history and (b) several prototypical prob-
lematic situations to enable the therapist to identify
problematic core beliefs, dysfunctional assumptions, and
maladaptive compensatory strategies (for a diagrammatic
representation, see J. S. Beck, 1995). Developmental
experiences, core beliefs, conditional assumptions, and
compensatory strategies are related to each other in un-
derstandable ways. In brief, adverse developmental expe-
riences (e.g., an intensely and enduringly critical parent)
lead to maladaptive core beliefs (e.g., “I am no good”),
with subsidiary beliefs (e.g., “If I am upbeat and bubbly
at all times, no one will ﬁgure out that I am really no
good”) that are compensated for by a range of behavioral
strategies (e.g., “In all my interactions I will try to be as up-
beat as possible”).
The J. S. Beck and Persons case formulation systems re-
fer to formalized case formulation approaches. It is likely
that most cognitive therapists in practice use their own
personalized approach to case formulation, although we
are aware of no completed research that examines how the
method, content, and process of “real world” case formu-
lation diﬀers from formalized systems set out in published
work and taught in cognitive therapy training programs.
THE SCIENCE AND PRACTICE OF COGNITIVE THERAPY
AND CASE FORMULATION
Having described cognitive case formulation, we set out
some criteria to evaluate the scientiﬁc basis of cognitive
case formulation. We suggest that criteria can be sepa-
rated into two approaches:“top-down”and “bottom-up.”
We call the assumption that a cognitive case formulation
should draw primarily on well-validated aspects of cogni-
tive theory “top-down”(i.e., generalizations from theory
are applied to particular cases). Like others, we have made
the assumption that within the scientist-practitioner
model a therapist draws on theory and research that in-
forms practice (Eells, 1997; Denman, 1995; Salkovskis,
2002). As such, “every application of scientiﬁc inquiry
is based on an inference from hypotheses (which are uni-
versal) to single cases, i.e., upon a deduction of singular
predictions” (Popper, 1959, p. 64). Within a scientist-
practitioner model, each element in the cognitive case
formulation should be subjected to the following ques-
tions:Are the constructs in cognitive theory that under-
pin cognitive case formulation substantiated by evidence?
And are the relationships between these elements sub-
stantiated by evidence? A positive answer to these ques-
tions is the basis on which cognitive case formulation
schemes are set out (e.g., J. S. Beck, 1995; Persons &
Tompkins, 1997).
Bottom-up criteria relate to the reliable, valid, and
functional mapping of a case formulation onto a person’s
presenting problems. For evaluating the empirical basis of
cognitive case formulation this criterion can be broken
down into the following bottom-up queries:(a) Can cog-
nitive therapists reliably formulate cases using the cognitive
case formulation systems? (b) Are the key constructs in
case formulations meaningfully related to the person’s pre-
senting problems? (c) Does cognitive case formulation lead
to improved treatment and treatment outcomes? (d) Does
cognitive formulation provide a fertile framework that can
be readily and usefully applied? We begin by brieﬂy re-
viewing the extensive literature relating to the top-down
criteria. Then we examine the literature relating to the
bottom-up criteria. Finally, we outline a research agenda
for future research into cognitive case formulation.
At the outset the most critical question might be, “Are
our questions answerable?”2 By reference to a program of
research on the Core Conﬂictual Relationship Theme
(CCRT) case formulation method (Luborsky & Crits-
Christoph, 1998), we show how 25 years of research on the
CCRT suggests that the CCRT meets many of the crite-
ria we have set out.
A person’s description of his or her relationships is used
in the CCRT method to infer core themes in relationship
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responses from others, and responses from the self). The
authors make explicit links to underlying psychodynamic
theory and have developed a systematic and transparent
scoring methodology (Luborsky & Crits-Christoph,
1998). In terms of reliability, a recent review of eight stud-
ies examining judges’ agreement about core relationship
themes, found agreement in the moderate-to-good range
(κ = 0.6–0.8; Luborsky & Diguer, 1998). Reliability was
better for some aspects of the CCRT than for others, and
more skilled and systematic judges tended to show higher
rates of agreement with each other (Luborsky & Diguer).
Evidence of test-retest reliability has been established from
the assessment-to-early-treatment phase (Barber, Luborsky,
Crits-Christoph, & Diguer, 1998). In terms of validity,
pervasiveness of core conﬂictual relationship themes have
been associated in predicted ways with defensive func-
tioning (Luborsky, Crits-Christoph, & Alexander, 1990).
Furthermore, changes in CCRT pervasiveness have been
associated with symptom changes during therapy (Crits-
Christoph & Luborsky, 1998), although the size of changes
in CCRT pervasiveness was small (especially for wishes)
and the size of the association was modest.
In terms of relationship to outcome, accurate interpre-
tations based on CCRT-derived case formulations have
been associated with symptom improvements in a study of
43 clients in brief psychodynamic psychotherapy (Crits-
Christoph, Cooper, & Luborsky, 1988). A reasonable
explanation of these ﬁndings is that accurate case formu-
lations can aﬀect outcome, either directly through the
choice of highly appropriate interventions, or more indi-
rectly by enhancing the therapeutic relationship. However,
the evidence is conﬂicting, with one study suggesting that
accuracy on key elements of the CCRT predicted changes
in the relationship (Crits-Christoph, Barber, & Kurcias,
1993) and another failing to demonstrate this eﬀect (Crits-
Christoph, Cooper, & Luborsky, 1988).
In summary, the CCRT appears to be a case formula-
tion method that is reliable, valid, and related to improved
outcomes. However, the CCRT development group has
undertaken most of the research, and it remains to be seen
whether independent research will replicate these ﬁnd-
ings. Nonetheless, the CCRT method suggests that a sys-
tematic and coherent case formulation approach, when
used by well-trained and skilled practitioners, can meet
the scientiﬁc criteria we have set out. We would argue
therefore that this brief review of the CCRT suggests the
questions we ask of cognitive case formulation are mean-
ingful and answerable.
A TOP-DOWN ANALYSIS OF COGNITIVE CASE
FORMULATION: IS CASE FORMULATION
UNDERPINNED BY EVIDENCE-BASED THEORY?
We have elected to examine the evidence base of cognitive
case formulation by using several categories of disorders in
which a cognitive theory (CT) model is available:depres-
sion, anxiety disorders, and personality disorders.3 We re-
view the literature relating to the evidence base for the
key elements of cognitive case formulation by addressing
a series of falsiﬁable hypotheses relating to the deﬁnable
and possibly operational factors within formulation (i.e.,
situation-emotion-thought-behavior cycle, early life
events and parenting, core beliefs, and dysfunctional as-
sumptions and compensatory strategies). We will then ex-
amine the linkages between each of these components.
We begin with the most essential and well-researched
component:the situation-emotion-thought-behavior cycle.
Situation-Emotion-Thought-Behavior Cycle
The cycle of situation-emotion-thought-behavior (SETB)
is the most familiar, and perhaps central, feature of the
cognitive formulation. The cognitive model takes as its
starting point the notion that it is one’s interpretation of
any event, rather than the event itself, that leads to emo-
tional distress, whether this interpretation is negative aﬀect
or anxious arousal (A. T. Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery,
1979; A. T. Beck, Emery, & Associates, 1985; Clark &
Beck, 1999). What is the empirical status of this assertion
in depression, anxiety, and personality disorders?
For depression, at least two sets of reviewers have com-
prehensively assessed the SETB question separated by a
nearly 10-year span (Clark & Beck, 1999; Haaga, et al.,
1991). For the SETB cycle, four hypotheses are particularly
relevant for depression:(a) negativity, depression is charac-
terized by the presence of self-referent negative thinking,
(b) speciﬁcity, depression has a distinct cognitive proﬁle in
terms of both content and process, (c) selective-processing,
depression is characterized by a processing bias for negative
self-referent information, and (d) primacy, negative cogni-
tion inﬂuences behavior and emotion. For the negativity
hypothesis, the large majority of critical studies have sup-
ported this notion, using both thought “checklists” and
more open-ended inquiries about the content of cognition
(A. T. Beck, Brown, Steer, Eidelson, & Riskind, 1987;
COGNITIVE CASE FORMULATION • BIELING & KUYKEN 55
AQ5Dobson & Shaw, 1986;Hollon, Kendall, & Lumry, 1986;
Ingram, Kendall, Smith, Donnell, & Ronan, 1987;Whis-
man, Diaz, & Luboski, 1993). The speciﬁcity hypothesis
argues that psychological disorders can be distinguished
from one another according to distinct cognitive proﬁles,
and indeed depression does appear to be characterized by
negative cognitions when compared to cognition in other
disorders (A. T. Beck, Steer, & Epstein, 1992;Clark, Beck,
& Stewart, 1990;Sanz & Avia, 1994;Steer, Beck, Clark, &
Beck, 1994). Also, there is good evidence for the selective-
processing hypothesis—depressed persons show a bias to-
ward selecting mood-congruent, negative information
from the environment—and many studies do suggest that
depressed individuals ﬁnd negative and positive interpre-
tations of ambiguous stimuli equally acceptable, whereas
nondepressed individuals prefer positive interpretations
(e.g., Crowson & Cromwell, 1995, Dykman, Abramson,
Alloy, & Hartlage, 1989; Moretti et al., 1996; Weary &
Williams, 1990).
Most critical for formulation, the primacy hypothesis
suggests a link between negative thoughts, emotions, and
behavior. One research program has illustrated that rumi-
native, self-focused negative thoughts are systematically re-
lated to enduring negative mood, particularly among
depressed women (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; Nolen-
Hoeksema, Morrow, & Fredrickson, 1993). Other studies
attempt to reduce negative thought content to examine the
impact of such cognitive change on aﬀect (Persons &
Burns, 1985; Teasdale & Fennell, 1982). Overall, both
types of studies demonstrate a reciprocal link between neg-
ative moods and negative thoughts. Depressed individuals
also demonstrate negative interpersonal behavior that can
be reliably distinguished from that of nondepressed indi-
viduals (e.g. Bieling & Alden, 2001;Coyne, 1976;Gotlib
& Hammen, 1992; Joiner & Metalsky, 1995). Overall,
then, for depression there appears to be consistent evi-
dence for most components of the SETB cycle, including
negativity, speciﬁcity, selective processing, and primacy.
Models for anxiety disorders emerged somewhat later
than the original cognitive theory of depression, so less re-
search is available on the SETB cycle in anxiety disorders.
However, cognitive models of the various anxiety disor-
ders, including generalized anxiety disorder, panic disorder,
and social phobia, use conceptual-theoretical models that
incorporate a cue or situation (e.g., a social situation or an
anomalous physical sensation), a cognition (e.g., threat
thoughts), emotional and physical reactions (e.g., fear and
heart palpitations), and behavior (e.g. avoidance or safety
behavior). Supporting such models, a recent review con-
cluded that individuals with panic disorder selectively
attend to threat words and uncomfortable physical sen-
sations, and social phobics attend selectively to social threat
words (Antony & Swinson, 2000). Individuals with panic
disorder also display explicit and implicit memory biases
for threat words and physical sensations (Amir, McNally,
Riemann, & Clements, 1996;Lundh, Czyzykow, & Öst,
1997; Westling & Öst, 1993). Social phobics also appear
to be better at remembering faces with a negative or crit-
ical expression, and are more likely to interpret ambiguous
social interactions negatively (Constans, Penn, Ihen, &
Hope, 1999;Gilboa-Schechtman, Freshman, Amir, & Foa,
1997;Lundh & Öst, 1996). Overall, this research suggests
a coupling of thoughts, emotions, and physical sensations
in anxiety.
In personality disorders cognitive models emphasize
that SETB processes are rooted in deeper cognitive struc-
tures that are central to personality dysfunction (A. T.
Beck et al., 1990;Young, 1990). To date, research on the
model is limited, perhaps because of the heterogeneity of
personality disorders and diﬃculties with reliable diag-
nostic schemes (Arntz, 1999). Nonetheless, in one study
using a cognitive proﬁle approach, researchers identiﬁed
a higher proportion of sociotropic thoughts and beliefs
in Cluster C patients, especially in dependent personality
disorders (Nordahl & Stiles, 2000). Preliminary research
in this area has also supported the cognitive model’s pre-
diction that people with particular personality disorders
will report speciﬁc maladaptive beliefs (Dreessen, Arntz,
Hendriks, Keune, & van den Hout, 1999;Veen & Arntz,
2000). Although the overall number of studies is small and
contains quite heterogeneous personality pathology in dif-
ferent samples, this research has generally supported the
presence of personality-related processing biases at the level
of automatic thoughts.
Early Life Events, Parenting, and Cognition
A second central feature of cognitive formulation is the de-
velopment of a cognitive diathesis. Cognitive theory posits
that the “child learns to construe reality through his or her
early experiences with the environment, especially with
signiﬁcant others,”and that “sometimes, these early expe-
riences lead children to accept attitudes and beliefs that
will later prove maladaptive”(A. T. Beck & Young, 1985,
p. 207). This notion, termed developmental cognitive media-
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mediate between developmental risk factors and subse-
quent onset of depression, anxiety, and personality dis-
orders (Ingram & Price, 2001). Given that comprehensive
and high-quality reviews of these literatures exist (see In-
gram and Price), only a brief summary of the evidence
base, with some representative studies, will be included
here.
There is consistent support that loss in childhood (e.g.,
Andrews & Brown, 1995;Bifulco, Brown, & Harris, 1987;
Brown & Harris, 1978;Harris, Brown, & Bifulco, 1986),
problematic parenting behaviors (e.g., Brewin, Firth-
Cozens, Furnham, & McManus, 1992; Cohn, Matias,
Tronick, Connell, & Lyons-Ruth, 1986;Field, 1984;Gar-
ber, Robinson, & Valentiner, 1997;Hammen et al., 1995;
Parker, 1983; Reinherz, Giaconia, Hauf, Wasserman, &
Silverman, 1999; Tronick & Gianino, 1986), and child-
hood sexual abuse (Andrews, Brown, & Creasey, 1990;Bi-
fulco, Brown, & Adler, 1991; Lizardi et al., 1995; Rose,
Abramson, Hodulik, Harberstadt, & Leﬀ, 1994) increase
the risk for development of depression. However, there
have been relatively fewer tests of the developmental cog-
nitive mediation hypothesis. In one study using an under-
graduate sample, limited support was found for a mediating
relationship of cognitive variables between reports of mal-
adaptive parenting and subsequent depression (Whisman &
McGarvey, 1995). In another study using a young-
adolescent sample, self-worth was found to mediate be-
tween reports of maternal parenting and depressive
symptoms (Garber et al., 1997).
Research on cognitive mediation in anxiety is also lim-
ited. In a comprehensive review of this literature, Rapee
(1991) concluded that there is a surprising consistency in
the research literature suggesting that reports of parental
overcontrol are associated with anxiety disorders (e.g.,
Dumas, LaFreviere, & Serketich, 1995;Siqueland, Kendall,
& Steinberg, 1996). A more substantive body of research
has examined the developmental hypotheses for personal-
ity disorders (See Bernstein, Cohen, Skodol, Bezirganian,
& Brook, 1996;Cicchetti & Cohen, 1995;Geiger & Crick,
2001; Millon & Davis, 1995), but, again, the direct evi-
dence for cognitive mediation in these studies is limited.
Support for the notion that early adversity leads to
psychopathology, including depression, anxiety disorders,
and personality disorders seems clear. However, there is a
paucity of research addressing the developmental cognitive
mediation hypothesis, leaving the answer to the question
of what mechanisms mediate pathways to risk of psycho-
pathology unanswered. To date, only limited innovative
work is beginning to address cognitive mechanisms. This
work tentatively suggests that maladaptive beliefs about
the self and others may emerge early in the development
of at-risk children (e.g., Bartholomew & Horowitz, 1991;
Coyne & Whiﬀen, 1995;Taylor & Ingram, 1999). We sug-
gest that there are probably suﬃcient grounds in the
research literature for practitioners to introduce develop-
mental trauma as important antecedents of psychopathol-
ogy, but the research does not yet support the notion of
speciﬁc, cognition-based linkages between adversity and
the development of speciﬁc disorders.
Core Beliefs
Core beliefs, or schemas, are fundamental to the cognitive
theory of depression (A. T. Beck, 1967; Clark & Beck,
1999), anxiety (A. T. Beck & Emery, 1985), and person-
ality disorders (A. T. Beck et al., 1990). These deep cogni-
tive structures are described as information-processing
constructs that also contain speciﬁc content (Clark & Beck,
1999;Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Matthews, 1997). Re-
searchers have used a variety of experimental paradigms to
examine core beliefs, including sentence completion and
autobiographical memory recall, and, indeed, numerous
studies support the notion of nonconscious, or deep, sche-
matic processing in depression and anxiety (Antony &
Swinson, 2000;Teasdale & Barnard, 1993;Teasdale, Tay-
lor, Cooper, Hayhurst, & Paykel, 1995). There is also strong
evidence that, even between episodes of depression, evi-
dence of potentially depressogenic beliefs can be found
by using experimental probes (Ingram et al., 1998;Segal,
Gemar, & Williams, 1999). Overall, there is substantial
evidence for the operation of deep cognitive structures in
depression, though many speciﬁc aspects of these struc-
tures, including their content, are not well understood
(Clark & Beck, 1999).
For anxiety the research literature on core beliefs is less
well developed. However, it has been argued that anxiety
is related fundamentally to activation of a “threat mode”
that marshals cognitive resources to minimize risk to the
organism (A. T. Beck & Clark, 1997). Another promising,
potentially parallel, line of enquiry known as looming mal-
adaptive style (LMS) has also recently been described (see
Riskind, Williams, Gessner, Chrosniak, & Cortina, 2000,
for a detailed exposition). There is a reliable self-report
measure of LMS (the LMSQ;Riskind et al., 1992) designed
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threatening situations (Riskind, Kelly, Moore, Harman, &
Gaines, 2000). Overall, the investigation of core beliefs and
schemas in anxiety is still developing, and it is diﬃcult to
make detailed or comprehensive conclusions.
In personality disorder core beliefs or schemas are
viewed as critical to initiating and maintaining psy-
chopathology (A. T. Beck et al., 1990; Pretzer & Beck,
1996), and two self-report instruments have been devel-
oped to assess the presence of these deep cognitive struc-
tures. The Young Schema Questionnaire (YSQ; Young,
1990) was developed to assess early maladaptive schemas
(EMS), and in one validity study a number of EMSs were
more prominent in the students who scored highest on
personality disorder pathology (Schmidt, Joiner, Young,
& Telch, 1995). Using a diﬀerent approach, A. T. Beck
and J. S. Beck (1991) have developed the Personality Be-
liefs Questionnaire (PBQ) based on current Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (American Psychiatric
Association, 1994) categorizations of personality disorders.
Using this measure, several studies suggest that dysfunc-
tional beliefs hypothesized to characterize personality dis-
orders are indeed reported at higher rates among people
diagnosed with these personality disorders (Beck et al.,
2001;Kuyken et al., 2001). Overall, then, there is some ev-
idence to support the notion of deep cognitive structures
in depression, anxiety, and personality disorders, and some
instruments are available to examine these constructs.
However, researchers are far from having a comprehensive
understanding of how such schemas operate and in what
circumstances. This kind of knowledge will have to come
from carefully conducted experiments and may require the
development of entirely new research paradigms that go
beyond self-report (Segal & Swallow, 1994).
Conditional Assumptions
The issue of conditional assumptions in cognitive formu-
lation has received limited empirical attention in the de-
pression literature and almost none in the anxiety disorders
and personality disorders domains. The most comprehen-
sive measure of this aspect of the cognitive model is the
Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale (DAS; Weissman & Beck,
1978), though it is still unclear whether this scale is speciﬁc
only to depression or might be useful in other disorders.
Because of its content, the DAS may also have applications
in the anxiety and personality disorders. Nine types of con-
ditional assumptions are reliably measured by the DAS, and
based on content, these attitudes may confer vulnerability
for a variety of diﬀerent disorders (A. T. Beck, Brown,
Steer, & Weissman, 1991). For example, in personality dis-
orders one study using the DAS found that the scores of
people diagnosed with borderline personality disorder
were higher than those of a control group and quite high
when compared to norms of people with other diagnoses
(O’Leary et al., 1991). However, for all the categories of
disorder we chose to examine, there is little other research
on the issue of conditional assumptions.
Compensatory Strategies
Cognitive formulation makes two related hypotheses about
coping and compensatory strategies. First, in the presence
of stressors, maladaptive use of cognitive and behavioral
coping strategies increases the chance of symptom onset or
symptoms’worsening. Second, the activation of maladap-
tive beliefs leads to the use of maladaptive compensatory
strategies directed at deactivating the beliefs and reducing
the associated negative aﬀect (J. S. Beck, 1995). The issue
of cognitive factors leading to maladaptive coping strategies
has not yet been addressed in anxiety or personality disor-
ders. Some research is available in depression, however.
For example, coping has been found to mediate the rela-
tionship between stressful events and symptoms (Coyne,
Aldwin, & Lazarus, 1981; Billings, Cronkite, & Moos,
1983;Swindle, Cronkite, & Moos, 1989), conditional be-
liefs have been associated with perceptions of social support
(Kuiper, Olinger, & Swallow, 1987; Norman, Miller, &
Dow, 1988), and people diagnosed with depression en-
gage in more avoidance coping and less approach coping
(Billings & Moos, 1984, 1985;Billings et al., 1983;Coyne
et al., 1981;Kuyken & Brewin, 1994). Despite these ﬁnd-
ings, there is little consensus about the connection be-
tween speciﬁc cognitions and speciﬁc coping strategies.
The Relations Between Constructs of the Formulation Model
Thus far, our review has addressed the main elements of
cognitive formulation with the model “cleaved at its
joints.” We also have addressed what research is available
regarding the theorized relationships between adjacent
elements of the model as set out in diagrammatic form
by J. S. Beck (1995). Our review suggests limited to good
support for many of the elements of the formulation when
considered in isolation. However, an analysis of higher
order questions that seek to link diﬀerent components
across the “joints”of the model is premature. The amount
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because the cognitive model was originally derived in
depression. Considering only depression, we have seen
good evidence for the situation-emotion-thought-behavior
cycle, deep cognitive structures, and maladaptive compen-
satory strategies. However, our review also suggests that
there is little evidence linking deep cognition to its pro-
posed antecedents, early life events, or its proposed conse-
quences, conditional beliefs, and compensatory strategies.
Also, although there is increasingly strong evidence for the
existence of deep-level cognition, much less is known
about the structure and processes that govern this level
of cognition in depression when compared to biases in
thinking.
For anxiety, our review suggests that there is consider-
able evidence for the link between particular cues, anx-
ious thoughts, emotions of fear, and physiological arousal.
Less well characterized in anxiety are developmental
antecedents, conditional assumptions, and compensation
strategies tied to these beliefs. This paucity of research may
be a result of the heterogeneity of the anxiety disorders, or
the fact that cognitive models for these disorders developed
more recently than models for depression. Certainly the
notion of a primal threat mode or maladaptive looming
style is a promising line of inquiry for understanding
deeper levels of cognition in anxiety.
For personality disorders there are many fewer studies
that have focused on cognitive factors speciﬁcally. Al-
though some measures of personality-related beliefs exist
(e.g. YSQ and PBQ), there are few studies using informa-
tion-processing paradigms to validate the SETB cycle in
personality disorders. Some results appear promising, but
the heterogeneity of personality disorders will make vali-
dation a long and challenging process. Nonetheless, the ev-
idence base appears to be growing, and interest in cognitive
formulation and cognitive models of personality disorder
is increasing (cf. Arntz, 1999).
Taken together, the elements of our review suggest that
at a nomothetic level cognitive theory of depression, anx-
iety disorders, and personality disorders is supported in
many of its descriptive hypotheses, and cognitive models
are under-studied in their more diﬃcult-to-operationalize
explanatory hypotheses. Thus, in the transfer to the idio-
graphic level, which deﬁnes case formulation, it follows
that descriptive statements are justiﬁable, but explanatory
statements should be stated as exploratory hypotheses at
best.
A BOTTOM-UP ANALYSIS OF COGNITIVE CASE
FORMULATION: ARE COGNITIVE CASE FORMULATIONS
RELIABLE, VALID, AND POSITIVELY RELATED TO
OUTCOME?
Our second-phase evaluation concerns the bottom-up cri-
teria. Speciﬁcally, is the process of case formulation reliable,
clinically valid, and related to improved outcomes?
Reliability of Cognitive Case Formulation
Can cognitive therapists reliably formulate cases by using
cognitive case formulation systems? In an early study raters
proved 76% accurate in identifying hypothesized under-
lying cognitive mechanisms for particular patients that
had been selected for study by an independent group of
therapists (Beckham, Boyer, Cook, Leber, & Watkins,
1984). Persons, Mooney, and Padesky (1995) had clini-
cians identify overt problems and underlying schemas or
beliefs. The results suggested generally good agreement
among judges in identifying manifest presenting problems
but poor agreement in identifying the hypothesized
underlying cognitive mechanisms. In a further study Per-
sons and Bertagnolli (1999) attempted to increase reliabil-
ity by supplying clinicians with a speciﬁc set of problem
domains (psychiatric symptoms, as well as interpersonal,
work, ﬁnancial, health, housing, and recreational prob-
lems) and more formalized assessment of schemas (using
anchor points and speciﬁc deﬁnitions of a variety of
schemas). Inter-judge reliabilities in assessing schemas re-
mained poor, (κ:0.37, single judges;0.72, averaged across
ﬁve judges;Persons & Bertagnolli, 1999). However, greater
training was associated with somewhat greater reliability
(Persons & Bertagnolli). In a very recent study use of a
highly systematized case formulation method led to con-
siderably higher reliability on some (e.g., core beliefs) but
not all inferential aspects (e.g., dysfunctional assumptions)
of cognitive case formulation (Fothergill & Kuyken, 2002).
The ﬁndings for level of training were inconclusive, with
the most experienced therapists showing highest agree-
ment on some key elements (e.g., of the primary core be-
liefs). However, they were not consistently more reliable
than the less experienced groups. Finally, in an atheoreti-
cal study of the case formulation method, good agreement
was found for the descriptive but not the inferential aspects
of case formulation (Eells, Kendjelic, & Lucas, 1998).
These studies suggest that good reliability can be obtained
for the descriptive but not the inferential aspects of cogni-
tive case formulation, and that reliability may be improved
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tion methods.
It is important to note that judgments and inferences
linking a person’s presenting problem to a psychological ac-
count of the problem are complex and multidetermined.
There is a distinguished theoretical and research lineage
suggesting that when people are faced with complex de-
cisions they maximize the chance of eﬃcient decision by
taking cognitive shortcuts. The short-cut heuristics in-
clude halo eﬀects, illusory correlations, framing biases, re-
cency eﬀects, conﬁrmatory biases, and failure to consider
normative standards (e.g., Dawes, 1986;Kuhberger, 1998;
Meehl, 1954, 1973; Simon, 1957; Spengler & Strohmer,
1994;Turk & Salovey, 1988;Wilson, 1996). For example,
a clinician who has a hypothesis that a person’s depression
is underpinned by a “powerlessness” core belief may look
only for conﬁrming evidence (conﬁrmatory bias) and see
her or his client’s diﬃculties regaining employment as a
consequence of this belief (illusory correlation). Clinicians
may make these errors so habitually that in cognitive case
formulations of identical cases using identical formulation
methods it is not possible to accurately establish consensus.
It follows from this fact that more systematic and objective
case formulation systems should be less prone to these in-
ferential biases, and “true”rates of agreement between cli-
nicians should be observable.
In summary, past studies make plain a method for eval-
uating the reliability of formulation, and they appear to
oﬀer evidence that at least some aspects of the model can
be reliably identiﬁed by multiple judges. Moreover, there
is some evidence that more systematic cognitive case for-
mulation methods lead to greater reliability and appear to
improve with training. However, given the methodologi-
cal constraints, the studies reviewed here are still inade-
quate tests of the reliability of formulation. Finally, there
are two important caveats in establishing the reliability of
case formulation. First, it may yet be found that clinicians
can reliably complete case formulations;however, this does
not mean that they are valid. Furthermore, whether clini-
cians can reliably formulate a case is quite distinct from
whether the constructs relate to each in the hypothesized
manner across situations or time. We know of no studies
that bear on the reliability of cognitive case formulations
across situations or time.
Clinical Validity of Cognitive Case Formulation
Are the key constructs in case formulations meaningfully
related to a person’s presenting problems? Our earlier brief
review of the CCRT outlined a range of studies examin-
ing this question. We know of no evidence that attempts
to show hypothesized relationships between the content
of a cognitive case formulation and related aspects of
psychological-psychiatric functioning in a particular case.
In short, there is no evidence to conﬁrm or falsify the va-
lidity of cognitive case formulation.
Relationship Between Case Formulation and Treatment Outcome
Does cognitive case formulation lead to improved treat-
ment and treatment outcomes? Hayes, Nelson, and Jarrett
(1987) have argued that the treatment utility of a case for-
mulation is the cornerstone of its value. We agree that, to-
gether with reliability and validity, this criterion should be
a primary one whereby case formulation stands or falls. To
our knowledge, there is limited evidence linking case for-
mulation with outcome.
One early study compared manualized with individu-
alized marital therapy of distressed couples. In the individ-
ualized intervention, only interventions that matched a
formulation of the couples’ problems were oﬀered. Al-
though both conditions were comparable at termination,
individualized treatment led to somewhat improved main-
tenance of gains at 6-month follow-up (Jacobson et al.,
1989). It is worth noting, however, that the distinction be-
tween manualized and individualized formulation and
treatments is somewhat arbitrary, because many factors
confound this distinction (client, therapist, and therapy
process variables). Furthermore, there is some evidence
that therapists tailor manuals to individuals, even if in-
structed not to (Schulte, Kunzel, Pepping, & Shulte-
Bahrenberg, 1992).
Cognitive analytic therapy (Ryle, Leighton, & Pollock,
1997) involves the therapist and client in writing a joint
formulation letter early in therapy. Research using a
multiple-baseline, case study approach found no support
for the hypothesis that the formulation letter would lead to
improvements in the therapeutic alliance and treatment
outcomes (Evans & Parry, 1996). Two linked studies have
used a similar single-case series design to establish the ef-
fect of case formulation on the therapeutic relationship,
beliefs, and symptoms among people with delusions
(Chadwick, Williams, & MacKenzie, in press). It is inter-
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aﬀect patients’ratings of the alliance, but did positively in-
ﬂuence therapists’ratings of the alliance (Chadwick et al.).
Furthermore, case formulation, as an intervention in its
own right, did not clearly impact beliefs or symptoms,
even though the evidence suggested that successful subse-
quent restructuring of beliefs led to symptom improve-
ments (Chadwick et al.). Of note, the Chadwick et al.
study is limited to people with psychosis, where the eﬃ-
cacy and eﬀectiveness of cognitive therapy are not fully es-
tablished and treatment approaches are in development.
Finally, these studies share the assumption that the formu-
lation should be explicitly shared with the client, whereas
this sharing is not necessarily a feature of cognitive therapy.
We may use an analogy:A navigator who shares the whole
road map with the driver may hinder rather than help the
driver to keep on track, because the driver is given infor-
mation not directly relevant to the current task and the
amount of information may be overwhelming.
In summary, there is no compelling evidence linking
cognitive case formulation to improved treatment out-
comes. Indeed, the only positive beneﬁt, noted in one
study, has been improved ratings of the therapeutic alliance
by the therapist. Although standardized cognitive formula-
tions have only recently been published and there has been
little time to establish the relationship to outcome, this ab-
sence of support for what we consider a basic criterion is
of considerable concern. However, we would argue that
this may reﬂect a rather simplistic approach to the issues to
date. Studies have made the problematic assumption that
case formulation might directly impact outcome, rather
than indirectly through the selection of appropriate inter-
ventions. The Jacobson et al. (1989) study oﬀers some
support for the argument that the usefulness of case for-
mulation is in selecting the most appropriate interventions
at the most appropriate time. Can cognitive case formula-
tion be expected to have a direct impact on outcome, or,
as has been suggested with the CCRT, might cognitive
case formulation aﬀect outcome only through the selection
of appropriate interventions (Crits-Christoph et al., 1988)?
Usefulness in Practice of an Evidence-Based Cognitive Case
Formulation Approach
How useful in practice is cognitive case formulation? At
the nomothetic level cognitive theory and therapy have
generated more research than any other psychological
treatment. On the other hand, the use of systematic idio-
graphic cognitive formulation is a relatively recent devel-
opment and, with a few notable exceptions (Fothergill &
Kuyken, 2002;Persons & Bertagnolli, 1999), has generated
almost no research. In terms of clinical practice, it is in-
creasingly accepted as a dictum among cognitive therapy
trainers that a comprehensive and valid case formulation is
needed to successfully treat a person in distress, even more
so when the presenting problems are complex (J. S. Beck,
1995;Needleman, 1999). Indeed, a great deal of time and
expense is devoted to the training and supervision of
novice cognitive therapists in “the art of case formulation.”
Furthermore, cognitive formulation is increasingly being
used in therapy process research and therapy trials. Beyond
any doubt, cognitive therapy case formulation shows the
promise of meeting the fertility criterion in both practice
and research.
In terms of the acceptability and usefulness of cognitive
case formulation to clients in cognitive therapy, we know
of almost no research. Chadwick et al. (in press) inter-
viewed 11 patients with psychosis who had been treated
with cognitive therapy, which included a shared cognitive
case formulation. It is interesting that clients reported pos-
itive (reassured, encouraged, and hopeful) and negative
(saddened, upset, and worried) emotional reactions. The
reactions were based on increased understanding and see-
ing a way forward on the positive side and on increased
perceptions of problems as complex and longstanding on
the negative side. This suggests that clients may experience
cognitive case formulation as useful but may also experi-
ence it as unhelpful.
In insolation, the fertility criterion is neither necessary
nor suﬃcient to endorse the use of case formulation, be-
cause clinical psychology is littered with examples of highly
fertile but ultimately unsubstantiated ideas. However—to
use an evolutionary analogy—the “ﬁtness”of an idea will
determine its advance. In this sense, the systematic evalu-
ation of the case formulation approach can only contribute
to its ﬁtness with respect to a fuller understanding of its ex-
planatory power, clinical application, and acceptability to
cognitive therapy providers and consumers.
A RESEARCH AGENDA FOR COGNITIVE CASE
FORMULATION
Although the eﬃcacy and eﬀectiveness of cognitive ther-
apy for patients with a range of Axis I and some Axis II dis-
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an outstanding challenge is to provide an evidence base to
the individualized formulations that cognitive therapists
use to understand their clients’ presenting problems and
plan their interventions. For the top-down dimension of
evidence-based cognitive case formulation, research is be-
ing undertaken that addresses the explanatory elements of
cognitive theory of a wide range of disorders. From our re-
view, we suggest that researchers would be served by ex-
amining those “top-down” areas in which evidence for
the formulation is weak or equivocal. Nomothetic tests of
the cognitive model that keep in view not just a speciﬁc
hypothesis about a particular disorder, but also the general
formulation model, will yield the most important advances
for both researchers and clinicians. Luckily, research on
“top-down” questions emerges almost daily. Thus, the
outstanding questions about cognitive theory’s ability to
explain, as well as describe, a range of emotional disorders
will probably be answerable in due course. In stark con-
trast, there is an urgent need for programmatic research to
answer the many outstanding questions relating to the
bottom-up dimension of case formulation. That is to say,
what is the evidence base for the many claimed beneﬁts of
cognitive case formulation? We have identiﬁed several
foci for this research. The fact that research into the CCRT
case formulation method has yielded important advances
in our understanding about the brief psychodynamic
treatment modality (Luborsky & Crits-Christoph, 1998)
attests to the feasibility of the research program we suggest.
A ﬁrst wave of exploratory research might usefully de-
velop basic understanding of how practicing cognitive
therapists formulate in the real world. For example, how
widely is case formulation practiced by cognitive thera-
pists? What form of case formulation is used most often?
At what stage in the assessment-intervention process do
cognitive therapists derive working formulations, and how
are these working formulations revised during ongoing
work? What does the application of case formulation look
like in practice:Does the therapist hold the map, sharing
directions only on an as-needed basis, or is the map as a
whole drawn up collaboratively and agreed upon before
the therapist and client set oﬀ? And what are therapists’
views of the role and importance of case formulation in
their work? Much is assumed about case formulation in
practice (e.g., Needleman, 1999), and this research would
enable research-based advances in the profession’s under-
standing. This work could take the form of interviewing
practicing cognitive therapists, analyzing transcripts of
therapy sessions, or using survey, interview, and qualitative
research methods. It is likely that this research will ask more
questions than it answers, notably by posing the further
question, what factors determine which case formulation
approaches are best suited to particular therapeutic con-
texts, clients, and therapists? The case formulation ap-
proach for a minimally trained cognitive therapist working
in an assertive outreach service for young men with a
ﬁrst episode of psychosis is likely to be very diﬀerent
from the approach taken by a highly trained therapist
working in a specialist outpatient clinic for people with
mood diﬃculties.
There are many outstanding questions about the relia-
bility of cognitive case formulation. Given that the litera-
ture is conﬂicting (e.g., Fothergill & Kuyken, 2002; Per-
sons & Bertagnolli, 1999), it will be important to establish
under what circumstances cognitive therapists can agree
about a case formulation. There are large related research
literatures addressing the question of how people make
complex decisions and how decision making is affected
by a range of situational and individual factors: the per-
son’s values, cognitive complexity, and preferred decision-
making style;and the situation’s inherent complexity, risk,
and uncertainty. Examining clinical decision-making pro-
cesses using established theoretical and methodological
approaches from the decision-making literature (e.g.,
Dawes, 1986;Kuhberger, 1998) will shed valuable light on
the understanding of how therapists make decisions during
the formulation process and when this decision making
breaks down. Initial studies might identify to what extent
and under what circumstances therapists use various
information-processing biases (e.g., framing, conﬁrmatory,
and recency). An early example of this work amongst the-
oretically eclectic counselors showed that counselors who
scored lower on a cognitive complexity task were more
likely to use problematic short-cut heuristics in their clin-
ical decision making (Spengler & Strohmer, 1994). Repli-
cations and extensions of this sort of study will be of
considerable value.
There are obvious ways in which the methodology of
existing reliability studies can be improved. Studies to date
have used convenience samples rather than fully trained or
established cognitive therapists who might have a better
understanding of the theoretical concepts at hand and their
practical application. Furthermore, a combination of well-
controlled studies (e.g., Fothergill & Kuyken, 2002) with
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(namely videos of face-to-face interviews) is likely to en-
able increases in understanding. Finally, we would recom-
mend that studies incorporate in their design the clinical
reality that case formulation is an ongoing process, re-
sponsive to new data within and between therapy sessions.
Is there evidence of change in therapists’ formulations on
aspects of the formulation that would require adaptation as
new information becomes available? Is there evidence of
test-retest reliability on aspects of the case formulation that
would be expected to remain constant over time?
The sorts of reliability studies we have suggested pose an
additional question:Do certain decision-making heuristics
aﬀect the process of therapy? The ﬁnding that greater
counselor cognitive complexity prevents diagnostic over-
shadowing (Spengler & Strohmer, 1994) suggests several
plausible case formulation studies. For example, a study
might examine whether cognitive therapy for personality
disorders is more successful when undertaken by cognitive
therapists with greater cognitive complexity. Increased so-
phistication in therapy process research enables these sorts
of questions to be answered by careful examination of tran-
scripts of therapy sessions (to identify when ruptures occur
and examine how they are resolved) and session-by-session
measurement of changes in presenting problems and gen-
eral functioning.
A further phase of research is required to establish
whether the cognitive case formulation has construct and
convergent validity;that is, do cognitive case formulations
relate meaningfully to people’s problems and the factors
underlying these problems? Triangulation methodologies,
in which the case formulation is one corner of the tri-
angle, would yield valuable information about whether
therapists’case formulations map meaningfully onto a per-
son’s problems. Other corners of the triangle might be the
client’s own formulation; the clinical supervisor’s inde-
pendently derived formulation; the person’s diagnostic
proﬁle; information derived from standardized measures
of cognition, aﬀect, and behavior;and information derived
from methods used routinely in cognitive therapy to derive
core beliefs (e.g., downward-arrow technique), dysfunc-
tional assumptions (e.g., dysfunctional thought records),
and compensatory strategies (e.g., A-B-C analysis; J. S.
Beck, 1995). It is also important to establish whether case
formulations have predictive validity. A case formulation
should enable researchers to make predictions about ex-
pected relationships between the formulation and present-
ing problems, problems encountered in therapy process
and problems that are discussed recurrently in therapy ses-
sions. In short, can the formulation predict what clients
will think, feel, or do and what will happen over the course
of cognitive therapy?
Perhaps most important, future research should concern
itself with the link between formulation and outcome.
Studies in this area could examine whether cognitive ther-
apists whose cognitive interventions are based on a solid
working formulation achieve better outcomes than ther-
apists who do not use formulation. A related research ques-
tion would be whether adherence to a high-quality case
formulation improves treatment outcome through in-
creased therapeutic focus. A variable of interest in this sort
of study might be case complexity, with the working hy-
pothesis that adherence should prove more useful with
complex patients. Finally, our review suggests that the
research concerning whether aspects of case formula-
tion are associated with better therapeutic relationship
has produced conﬂicting ﬁndings both in the CCRT and
cognitive therapy literatures. Clearly, further research is
required to increase understanding of the relationship be-
tween case formulation, the therapeutic alliance, and ther-
apeutic outcome.
Although we have set out several criteria for evaluating
cognitive case formulation and have suggested avenues for
research, it is important to note that not all criteria must be
met for formulation to have value. Formulations may be
reliable and valid but have no impact on treatment out-
come. In contrast, they may be unreliable and invalid but
lead through some alternative mechanism (e.g., increasing
therapist self-conﬁdence or enhanced alliance) to improved
outcome. The research we have outlined would begin to
answer these questions and determine which criteria are
ultimately most important. This agenda will enable cogni-
tive therapy research and training programs to include
training in evidence-based case formulation.
CONCLUSION
The cognitive formulation is truly open to investigation
with experimental methods because of its level of detail,
speciﬁcity, and relative simplicity. In reality, the cognitive
case formulation is highly interwoven with research into
cognitive theory. The formulation method has deep roots
in these research programs and likely could not have
evolved without this research. Moreover, much of the re-
search completed to test cognitive hypotheses, especially
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tions for case formulation.
Our review suggests that, contrary to the claimed be-
neﬁts of cognitive case formulation, it is not a panacea,
and its evidence base is weak at best. Our review suggests
instead that it is a promising but currently limited approach
to describing and understanding patients’presenting prob-
lems. As research has contributed to the creation of the
cognitive formulation, the fully articulated formulation
now oﬀers a rich and fertile starting point for future re-
search. Researchers who turn their attention to this mat-
ter will be contributing to the creation of the ﬁrst
empirically validated and reliable scientist-practitioner ap-
proach to understanding and treating depression, anxiety,
and personality disorders.
At a more general level research on cognitive formula-
tion, theory, and therapy over more than 30 years provides
an exemplar of how several dimensions can be integrated:
science and practice, the individual case and general theory,
and inductive and deductive methods. Our review has
drawn on each of these elements to show that the obser-
vation of individual cases (e.g., A. T. Beck, 1963) can lead
to theory (e.g., A. T. Beck, 1967) that through extensive
scientiﬁc testing has proven to be a sound descriptive
theory (e.g., Clark & Beck, 1999;Haaga et al., 1991), and
has led to a therapy (A. T. Beck et al., 1979) that is ef-
ﬁcacious and eﬀective (e.g., DeRubeis & Crits-Christoph,
1998). The outstanding challenge is to complete the circle
and translate the substantiated elements of cognitive theo-
ries into a systematic case formulation that stands up to the
criteria of empirical validation and treatment utility.
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NOTES
1. A description of the assessment tools used to derive a cog-
nitive case formulation is beyond the remit of this article (see
J. S. Beck, 1995;Needleman, 1999).
2. We are grateful to commentators on an earlier draft of this
manuscript for posing this question.
3. This review is necessarily brief, in part because several
high-quality reviews of this literature are readily available.
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